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THE INDIVIDUAL COERCION DOCTRINE AND TYING
ARRANGEMENTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ROGER D. BLAIR* AND JEFFREY FINCI**
I. INTRODUCTION
A tying arrangement exists when a seller requires his customers
to buy one good (the tied good) as a condition of buying a second
good (the tying good). For example, the owner of a cemetery may
sell grave sites only upon the condition that the customer also buy
a vault. In this case, the grave site is the tying good while the vault
is the tied good.1 The social desirability of tie-in sales apparently
lies in the eye of the beholder. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court has adopted an extremely hostile attitude toward tie-in
sales. Given certain minimal conditions, tying arrangements are il-
legal per se.' This attitude stems from the simple belief that a
seller can use economic power in the tying good market to restrain
trade in the tied good market.' On the other hand, most econo-
mists have opposed a per se treatment of tie-in sales because such
a standard fails to account for the improvements in efficiency and
the attendant social welfare gains that a tying arrangement may
create.4
Tying arrangements have been popular with franchisors for a va-
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1. There have been many instances of tying arrangements in our business history. Salt
has been tied to salt dispensers, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947);
shipping services to land, Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); punch
cards to card processors, IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); and prefabricated hous-
ing to credit, Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). Other
examples abound.
2. Per se illegality usually means that the plaintiff need only prove the existence of the
proscribed business practice to prevail in court. For tying arrangements, however, the courts
have adopted a qualified per se approach since there are other elements besides the tie-in
arrangement which must be established. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. The judi-
cial attitude toward tying arrangements will be developed in more detail. See infra notes 44-
72 and accompanying text.
3. This view is the so-called "leverage theory" of tying arrangements in which monopoly
power in the tying good market is levered into a second market, the tied good market. This
theory will be examined in more detail. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
4. Comment, A New Approach to the Legality of Franchising Tie-Ins, 129 U. PA. L.
Rsv. 1267, 1267 n.1 (1981). See also Note, An Economic and Legal Analysis of Physical
Tie-Ins, 89 YALE L.J. 769 (1980) which advocates a rule of reason analysis under section 2 of
the Sherman Act.
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riety of reasons: as a means of extracting revenue from their fran-
chisees, as a means of ensuring quality control and as a means of
preventing improper substitution.' With the increasing popularity
of franchising in the past twenty years,' a large number of civil
antitrust cases have resulted.' Consequently, the lower courts are
presented with an increasing number of tying cases. In many in-
stances, these are class action suits which expose the franchisor to
potentially enormous treble damage awards.' These lower courts
are confronted by a dilemma. While the law is very clear that tying
arrangements are illegal, this illegality appears unfounded due to
the positive economic reasons for employing tying arrangements.
As a consequence some lower courts have introduced a new ele-
ment of proof in a tying violation: the individual coercion doctrine.
Absent an express contractual agreement which sets forth the tie,
some lower courts require a plaintiff to prove that he was coerced
by the seller to purchase the tied good. This, of course, is a sub-
stantial hurdle for private plaintiffs and can prevent class certifica-
tion.9 The individual coercion doctrine provides a way out of the
dilemma for those lower courts which disagree with a harsh ap-
proach toward tying.
Economists never have dealt explicitly with the coercion issue as
it relates to tying arrangements.10 This article will provide an eco-
5. See generally Comment, supra note 4, for an excellent analysis of the costs and bene-
fits associated with tying agreements in a franchising context. The commentator argues that
weighing these costs and benefits is not beyond judicial competence. Id. at 1268. See also
Blair & Kaserman, Vertical Control with Variable Proportions: Ownership Integration and
Contractual Equivalents, 46 S. ECON. J. 1118 (1980).
6. By 1981, franchising accounted for some 32% of all retail sales. BUREAU OF INDUSTRIAL
ECONOMICS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY 1979-1981 (1981).
7. Civil antitrust cases requesting damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1980), have plagued nearly every franchise relationship. See, e.g., McDonald's,
Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970
(1982); Carvel, Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dism., 381 U.S. 125
(1965); Kentucky Fried Chicken, Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging
Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977); and Midas Mufflers, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
8. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1980), provides treble damages for suc-
cessful plaintiffs: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States . .. and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained .. "
9. Class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires that common questions of fact or law predominate over individual questions. If each
member of a putative class must establish individually that he was coerced, class certificia-
tion is not appropriate. See infra notes 135-50 and accompanying text.
10. See Austin, The Individual Coercion Doctrine in Tie-In Analysis: Confusing and
Irrelevant, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 1143 (1977) for an analysis of the coercion doctrine from solely
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nomic interpretation of the individual coercion doctrine. First, it
develops the Supreme Court's attitude toward tying arrangements.
Second, it reviews the economic analysis of tying and uses this
analysis to critique the Supreme Court's per se treatment. In addi-
tion, it provides an alternative approach for legally analyzing
franchise tie-ins. Third, it analyzes recent lower court decisions
dealing with the individual coercion doctrine. The consequences of
this doctrine for private enforcement of the antitrust laws will be
examined along with the implications for franchising. In particular,
the authors will advance the argument that those courts favoring
implementation of the individual coercion doctrine protect the
franchisor and the franchising system from undeserving private
plaintiffs.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS
Prior to the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, tying cases had
to be brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act 1 which prohib-
its restraints of trade. Those efforts, however, proved to be largely
unsuccessful. For example, the A.B. Dick Company had a patent
on a duplicating machine. The users of the duplicator were re-
quired to use A.B. Dick ink, paper, and stencils. When another
firm manufactured and sold a substitute ink to be used in the A.B.
Dick duplicator, the firm was sued for contributory infringement of
the duplicator patent. In response, the defendant, ink manufac-
turer, argued that the Sherman Act had been violated by A.B.
Dick's tying arrangement and this fact should have voided the
agreement to use A.B. Dick's supplies. This defense failed. 12 Thus,
tying arrangements that involved patents were not considered to
be in violation of the Sherman Act.'3 Partly in response to this
decision, Congress included a prohibition against tying in section 3
of the Clayton Act' which provided the statutory foundation for
a legal perspective.
11. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides: "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
12. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 6 (1912), overruled, Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917). See also Heaton-Peninsular Button-
Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
13. Henry, 224 U.S. at 29-32.
14. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchan-
dise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,
1983]
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an increasingly hostile judicial attitude toward tying arrange-
ments."' In fact, with the first post-Clayton Act tying case,16 the
earlier benign attitude was immediately reversed.
The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement as "an
agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition
that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at
least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier. 1 7 The judiciary's instinct s has been that tying is used to
lever market power from the tying good market into the tied good
market. One of the best known and oft-repeated judicial assess-
ments of tying arrangements is contained in Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in an exclusive dealing case: "Tying agreements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." 19
Consequently, tying arrangements have been accorded the unfortu-
nate status of per se illegality20 under the antitrust laws.2 1
for use, consumption, or resale .. .or fix a price charged therefor, or discount
from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding
that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the . . . commodities
of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such
lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce.
15. "'[T]ying agreements fare harshly under the laws forbidding restraints of trade.'"
Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6 (citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 606 (1953)).
16. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). The
plaintiff held a patent on an essential mechanism in a film projector. The plaintiff at-
tempted to restrict the use of the projectors to showing only films made under other. patents
that the plaintiff held. The Supreme Court refused to uphold this arrangement stating that
the patentee could not impose any condition it chose on the machine's use as this would
extend the patent monopoly beyond its proper scope. Id. at 516.
17. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
18. The word instinct is Sullivan's but it is almost a perfect choice since we have seen
that precious little economic analysis supports the hostility accorded this business practice.
See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrRUST § 150, at 431 (1977).
19. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
20. Tying arrangements actually receive a qualified per se status since proof of the tie
alone is not sufficient. In addition, the plaintiff must prove either sufficient economic power
in the tying product or that a not insubstantial amount of commerce is involved, or both.
See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. Tying violations are also qualified per se be-
cause the defendant does have defenses. See infra note 71.
21. The advisability of per se treatment for tying has recently been questioned by sev-
eral astute commentators. Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Un-
precendented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 1019 (1977) (footnote
omitted), for example, remarked that "[tihere are second thoughts today on whether, as a
matter of policy, we may not have gone too far in condemning tie-ins. Combination sales
.. .may be an effective way of waging competition without any serious anticompetitive
effects." R. BORK, THE ANTTrrusT PARADox 365 (1978), had a more forceful assessment:
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Currently, tying arrangements are considered to be antitrust vio-
lations under section 3 of the Clayton Act,2 2 which prohibits condi-
tional sales, and section 1 of the Sherman Act,2 3 which prohibits
restraints of trade. The Supreme Court established somewhat dif-
ferent standards of proof for a per se violation under each Act in
its Times-Picayune decision.24 Generally, if (1) a seller conditions
the sale of one good on the purchase of a separate tied good, (2)
the supplier has sufficient market power in the tying good to re-
strain competition in the tied good, and (3) a not insubstantial vol-
ume of commerce is affected, then the seller is guilty of an illegal
tie under the Sherman Act. If in addition to the first requirement
either of the next two is met, then the tie-in sale has violated the
Clayton Act.25 The distinction between these two standards of ille-
gality has become blurred in practice due to the judicial attenua-
tion of standards of proof. The Supreme Court, in particular, has
seemingly combined the latter two requirements-whether inten-
tionally or not is unclear. 6
Separate Products. By definition, at least two products must be
involved to constitute tying. A tie-in sale exists when a seller must
buy one (the tied) product in order to obtain another (the tying)
product. Without the second product there cannot be a tied sale.
Consequently, a plaintiff must prove that two products are in-
volved. While this would seem to be a simple proposition in most
instances, it occasionally may be more complicated. For example, a
radio is actually a collection of component parts that the manufac-
turer may refuse to sell separately. As another example, consider
the fact that most shoe stores will not sell less than a pair of shoes.
Are these tying arrangements? In a sense they are, but these cases
can be resolved quite easily because very few people only want one
shoe. There are, however, more difficult cases. For example, the
Ford Motor Company redesigned its dash board in such a way that
its dealers had to use radios installed by Ford. As a result, inde-
"Antitrust treats . . . [tying arrangements] as utterly pernicious, despite the increasingly
obtrusive fact that it has found no adequate grounds for objecting to them at all." His
dissatisfaction is consistent with that of Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust
Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506, 508-10 (1974), and Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner: Com-
ment on a Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 39, 40-41 (1978).
22. For the precise language of the Clayton Act, see supra note 14.
23. For the specific language of the Sherman Act, see supra note 11.
24. 345 U.S. 594, 608-609 (1953).
25. Id. These rules will be discussed in greater detail. See infra notes 39-43 and accom-
panying text.
26. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-04 (1969).
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.pendent radio producers were foreclosed from selling to Ford deal-
ers." Is this a tie-in imposed upon the dealers by Ford's design
decision? In this case; the court said that Ford's design decision
was independent of its contracts with its dealers and consequently
there was no tying arrangement. The court considered and rejected
the argument that there were two separate products involved.28
A very important single-product defense was raised by McDon-
ald's, 9 which developed a system of hamburger restaurants oper-
ated by franchisees and which collected royalties from their fran-
chisees' sales. McDonald's selected a location for the new
restaurant, bought the land, built the restaurant, and located a
franchisee for the site. The franchisee had to contract with Mc-
Donald's for the use of the McDonald's trademark and also had to
lease the building and land. Principe, a McDonald's franchisee, al-
leged an illegal tie of the. lease of the building and land to the
trademark. The court ruled that the trademark license and the
building lease were really a single product-the franchise. Both the
trademark license and the leased property were "integral compo-
nents of the business method being franchised. Where the chal-
lenged aggregation is an essential ingredient of the franchised sys-
tem's formula for success, there is but a single product and no tie-
in exists as a matter of law."30
Formulation of Current Doctrine. Once it is established that two
separate products are involved, a plaintiff must offer proof of the
second and third prongs of the three-prong test for tying arrange-
ments. Current tying doctrine has emerged from the Supreme
Court's experience with the practice. An examination of this devel-
opment also will reveal the Court's policy concerns regarding this
business practice.
In the early tying cases, the Court had little difficulty finding
market power in the tying good market. For the most part, the
defendants had patents on the tying goods which provided legal
monopolies."1 These early cases developed the leverage theory of
tie-in sales wherein a seller extended his monopoly in one market
27. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 242 F. Supp. 852, 853 (D. Mass. 1965).
28. Id. at 857.
29. Principe, 631 F.2d 303.
30. Id. at 309.
31. Two earlier cases which involved patented tying goods were United Shoe Mach.
Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), in which the lease of unpatented shoe machin-
ery was tied to patented shoe machinery, and IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), in
which unpatented punch cards were tied to the lease of patented computer equipment.
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to another market by tying one product to a second product.3 2 For
example, the International Salt Company 3 owned patents on the
Lixator, a machine that dissolved rock salt into brine for various
industrial purposes, and the Saltomat, a machine that injected salt
tablets into carined products during the canning process. Rather
than being sold, these machines were leased to their users. One of
the lease terms required the lessees to purchase all unpatented salt
and salt tablets used in the machines from International Salt. In
essence, salt and salt tablets were tied to the patented machines.
The government sought to enjoin International Salt from carrying
out the leases and alleged violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act
and section 3 of the Clayton Act. International Salt's practices of-
fended the Court because the patents were being used to restrain
trade in unpatented salt. In this instance, the Court inferred the
existence of market power from the existence of patents on the
Lixator and Saltomat. 4
Section 3 of the Clayton Act only forbids conditional sales when
they result in a substantial lessening of competition or tend to cre-
ate a monopoly. It is from this statute that the Court developed
the "not insubstantial" amount of commerce prong of the per se
test. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in a somewhat casual
fashion. It observed that International Salt sold about 119,000 tons
of salt in 1944 for approximately $500,000.6 Without regard to the
size of the total market, the Court held that "[t]he volume of busi-
ness affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant
or insubstantial.3 7
Thus, the International Salt case stands for the proposition that
a tie-in sale by a monopolist violates the antitrust laws when it
forecloses competitors from a not insubstantial market. The pre-
cise dimensions of substantiality were not specified very clearly at
this point. Presumably, little question was ever raised about mar-
32. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6.
33. International Salt Co., 332 U.S. 392. A very interesting analysis and critique of this
decision is provided by Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22 J.L. & ECON. 351 (1979).
34. The appellant's patents confer a limited monopoly of the invention they reward.
From them appellant derives a right to restrain others from making, vending or
using the patented machines. But the patents confer no right to restrain use of, or
trade in, unpatented salt. By contracting to close this market for salt against com-
petition, International has engaged in a restraint of trade for which its patents
afford no immunity from the antitrust laws.
332 U.S. at 395-96.
35. See supra note 14.
36. 332 U.S.at 395.
37. Id. at 396.
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ket power because the International Salt Company had a lawful
monopoly on its machines through its patents and therefore mar-
ket power was presumed.
Tying arrangements clearly involve a conditional sale and there-
fore are subject to section 3 of the Clayton Act. 8 They also alleg-
edly restrain trade and thereby are subject to section 1 of the
Sherman Act.3 ' In 1953, the Supreme Court laid down the different
standards of illegality under the Sherman and Clayton Acts in its
Times-Picayune decision. 40 It also articulated the antitrust con-
cerns surrounding the business practice of tying.
The Times-Picayune case involved a newspaper publisher that
owned both the only morning newspaper and one of the two after-
noon newspapers in New Orleans. Under the publisher's "unit
plan", advertisers were not permitted to buy advertising space in
either newspaper separately. Instead, they had to buy space in
both or in neither paper.4'1 Because the government filed suit under
the Sherman Act, the Court felt compelled to distinguish between
the Sherman and Clayton Acts' standards of illegality. After sum-
marizing the previous tying cases decided by the Court, the major-
ity stated:
When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for
the "tying" product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in
the "tied" product is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the
narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because
from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition
is inferred. And because for even a lawful monopolist it is "unrea-
sonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market," a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman
Act whenever both conditions are met.42
Thus, the Court held that the Sherman Act condemns a tying ar-
rangement whenever "monopoly" power is shown in the tying good
and a "substantial" amount of commerce in the tied good is af-
fected. In contrast, the Clayton Act is offended when either of
these conditions is satisfied. Subsequent decisions have so attenu-
ated the requirements for proving either condition that there is
practically no distinction between the Sherman Act and the Clay-
38. See supra note 14.
39. See supra note 11.
40. 345 U.S. 594.
41. Id. at 596-97.
42. Id. at 608-09 (footnote omitted).
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ton Act.4
In Times-Picayune, the Court expressed its concerns over the
economic effects of tie-in sales. Specifically, it was concerned about
the buyer's freedom of choice being curtailed.44 More importantly,
however, the Court was concerned about market foreclosure. When
a customer accepts a tying arrangement, competitors in the tied
good market are foreclosed from selling to the purchasers of the
tying good.45 For example, the competitors of International Salt
were foreclosed from selling salt or salt tablets to those customers
who used the Saltomat or the Lixator.
In its Northern Pacific"' decision in 1958, the Court reiterated
its concern for buyer sovereignty and foreclosure of competitors. 7
As part of a program to encourage the private development of rail-
roads, Congress gave Northern Pacific approximately 40 million
acres of land in checkerboard fashion along its proposed line. This
permitted intermittent private development and subsequent sale
or lease by the railroad. These land grants were made in 1864 and
1870. By 1949, Northern Pacific sold approximately 37 million
43. See infra notes 44-71 and accompanying text.
44. "By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller co-
erces the abdication of buyers' independent judgment as to the 'tied' product's merits and
insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market." 345 U.S. at 605.
45. "[T]he effect on competing sellers attempting to rival the 'tied' product is drastic: to
the extent the enforcer of the tying arrangement enjoys market control, other existing or
potential sellers are foreclosed from offering up their goods to a free competitive judgment;
they are effectively excluded from the marketplace." Id. at 605.
46. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. 1. An excellent examination of this case is provided by
Cummings & Ruhter, The Northern Pacific Case, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 329 (1979).
47. For our purposes a tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a
party to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that prod-
uct from any other supplier. Where such conditions are successfully exacted com-
petition on the merits with respect to the tied product is inevitably curbed. In-
deed [tying arrangements] . . . deny competitors free access to the market for the
tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market.
At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing
products. For these reasons [tying agreements] . . . are unreasonable in and of
themselves whenever a party has sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied
product and a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected. . ..
Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the tying product so
that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pressure buyers into taking the
tied item any restraint of trade attributable to such tying arrangements would
obviously be insignificant at most.
356 U.S. at 5-6 (footnotes & citations omitted).
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acres and leased the remainder."" In many of its sales contracts
and nearly all of its leases, Northern Pacific included a "preferen-
tial routing" clause. These preferential routing clauses compelled
the buyer or the lessee "to ship over its lines all commodities pro-
duced or manufactured on the land, provided that its rates (and in
some instances its service) were equal to those of competing carri-
ers."4 Thus, the basic question before the Court was whether the
preferential routing clause in the Northern Pacific sale and lease
agreements constituted an illegal tying arrangement under section
1 of the Sherman Act.
The Court disposed of this question without much trouble.50 It
held that Northern Pacific's preferential routing clause was an ille-
gal tying arrangement because Northern Pacific had "sufficient ec-
onomic power" to appreciably restrain trade in transportation ser-
vices." This was an important step in the attenuation of the
standards of illegality set out in Times-Picayune. The Court made
it very clear that the standard was being relaxed:
While there is some language in the Times-Picayune opinion
which speaks of 'monopoly power' or 'dominance' over the tying
product as a necessary precondition for application of the rule of
per se unreasonableness to tying arrangements, we do not con-
strue this general language as requiring anything more than suffi-
cient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on free
competition in the tied product (assuming all the time, of course,
that a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is
affected) .2
In other words, the Court was no longer requiring that the seller
have monopoly power or dominance in the market for the tying
good in order to find a violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act or
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court relied upon the strategic
location of Northern Pacific's land and the number of tying ar-
rangements to infer sufficient economic power.5 3
48. Id. at 2-3.
49. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
50. "We wholly agree that the undisputed facts established beyond any genuine question
that the defendant possessed substantial economic power. Id. at 7.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 11.
53. This land was strategically located in checkerboard fashion amid private hold-
ings and within economic distance of transportation facilities. . . . [C]ommon
sense makes it evident that this particular land was often prized by those who
purchased or leased it and was frequently essential to their business activities. In
ANTITRUST
The Supreme Court's standard for determining the existence of
sufficient economic power in the tying good continued its down-
ward slide with the Loew's decision 4 in 1962. The salient feature
of this case was that six major distributors of pre-1948 copyrighted
movies for television broadcasting engaged in block booking. In
selling films to television stations, the defendants put one or more
desirable feature films in a package or block with one or more un-
wanted or inferior films. For example, station WTOP obtained
classics like "Casablanca" and "The Man Who Came to Dinner"
along with the less noteworthy "Tugboat Annie Sails Again" and
"Tear Gas Squad." 6
The Court decided that market dominance need not be shown at
all and that economic power may be ascertained qualitatively:
Market dominance-some power to control price and to exclude
competition-is by no means the only test of whether the seller
has the requisite economic power. Even absent a showing of mar-
ket dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from
the tying product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness
in its attributes."
Thus, the indicia of sufficient economic power57 were broadened to
include "uniqueness" and "desirability." In the case at hand, this
was necessary because Loew's market share was indeterminate."
disposing of its holdings the defendant entered into contracts of sale or lease cov-
ering at least several million acres of land which included "preferential routing"
clauses. The very existence of this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling
evidence of the defendant's great power, at least where, as here, no other explana-
tion has been offered for the existence of these restraints. The "preferential rout-
ing" clauses conferred no benefit on the purchasers or lessees. While they got the
land they wanted by yielding their freedom to deal with competing carriers, the
defendant makes no claim that it came any cheaper than if the restrictive clauses
had been omitted.
Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
54. United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962). A concise economic analysis of this
case was presented by Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking,
1963 Sup. CT. REV. 152.
55. 371 U.S. at 41-42.
56. Id. at 45 (footnote omitted).
57. By this time, the Court's position was that "[tlhe requisite economic power is pre-
sumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted." Id. at 45-46 (citations omitted).
58. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 373, 381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), rev'd in
part, 371 U.S. 38 (1962). The Court also raised the customary antitrust concerns regarding
tying arrangements: "[T]hey may force buyers into giving up the purchase of substitutes for
the tied product ... and they may destroy the free access of competing suppliers of the tied
product to the consuming market.. . ." 371 U.S. at 45 (citation omitted).
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The current standards of proof for per se illegality of tying ar-
rangements emerged from the Fortner litigation." In 1960, Fortner
Enterprises, a real estate development corporation, obtained a
$2,000,000 loan from a U.S. Steel subsidiary to buy prefabricated
houses from a U.S. Steel division and to buy the land on which
they were to be built, which was not owned by U.S. Steel. In addi-
tion, the loan was sufficient to cover all construction costs. Since
the credit terms were highly advantageous, Fortner leaped at the
unusual bargain which permitted it to erect 210 houses.60 Appar-
ently, Fortner was not a very good credit risk." It defaulted on the
U.S. Steel loan complaining that the houses were too expensive
and were not of high quality.62 Fortner filed an antitrust suit alleg-
ing that U.S. Steel illegally tied its overpriced prefabricated houses
to the extraordinary loan.
In Fortner I,6" the issue before the Court was whether Fortner
was entitled to its day in court since the lower court had granted
U.S. Steel a summary judgment. The majority held that a tie-in
sale had occurred.6 4 Since the volume of commerce affected was
neither paltry nor insubstantial, one element of the test for per se
illegality was satisfied.6 5 The majority held that one can infer the
existence of market power when "the seller has the power to raise
prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with
respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the market." 6
This comes very close to saying that the ability of a seller to im-
pose a tying arrangement on its customers provides proof of the
market power that makes tying illegal. But if this were the case
promotional sales would constitute illegal ties. As a reductio ad ab-
surdum, suppose a gasoline station offered a free car wash with the
59. The Fortner litigants made three major appearances before the district court, three
before the circuit court of appeals and two before the Supreme Court. United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977), was the final Supreme Court decision.
See Handler, supra note 21, at 1017 n.225 for a concise summary of the history of the Fort-
ner litigation.
60. 429 U.S. at 613-14.
61. Id. at 616.
62. Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower, Nor a Lender
Be", 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 7-8.
63. Fortner, 394 U.S. 495. An exceptionally incisive analysis of this decision is provided
in Dam, supra note 62.
64. 394 U.S. at 498.
65. Id. at 501.
66. Id. at 504. This index of economic power arose first in Northern Pacific where the
host of tying arrangements was compelling evidence of Northern Pacific's great power. 356
U.S. at 7-8. See supra note 50.
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purchase of at least ten gallons of gasoline. This would be an illegal
tying sale if a large number of customers took advantage of the
offer. Surely, the majority did not intend such a result. In any
event, the case was remanded to the district court with directions
that the case be set for trial.
When Fortner 1167 was decided, the Supreme Court apparently
recognized that some of the Fortner I language was unfortunate. In
holding for U.S. Steel, the Court reiterated that the relevant trans-
actions involved a not insubstantial volume of commerce.68 It then
turned to the sufficiency of U.S. Steel's market power in the credit
market:
Although the Credit Corp. is owned by one of the Nation's larg-
est manufacturing corporations, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that this enabled it to borrow funds on terms more
favorable than those available to competing lenders, or that it was
able to operate more efficiently than other lending institutions. In
short, the affiliation between the petitioners does not appear to
have given the Credit Corp. any cost advantage over its competi-
tors in the credit market ...
The fact that Fortner-and presumably other Home Division
customers as well-paid a noncompetitive price for houses also
lends insufficient support to the judgment of the lower court.
Proof that Fortner paid a higher price for the tied product is con-
sistent with the possibility that the financing was unusually inex-
pensive and that the price for the entire package was equal to, or
below, a competitive price. ...
The most significant finding made by the District Court related
to the unique character of the credit extended to Fortner. This
finding is particularly important because the unique character of
the tying product has provided critical support for the finding of
illegality in prior cases. ...
Quite clearly, if the evidence merely shows that credit terms are
unique because the seller is willing to accept a lesser profit-or to
incur greater risks-than its competitors, that kind of uniqueness
will not give rise to any inference of economic power in the credit
market. Yet this is, in substance, all that the record in this case
indicates.
.The unusual credit bargain offered to Fortner proves nothing
more than a willingness to provide cheap financing in order to sell
expensive houses. Without any evidence that the Credit Corp.
67. 429 U.S. 610.
68. Id. at 611-12.
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had some cost advantage over its competitors-or could offer a
form of financing that was significantly differentiated from that
which other lenders could offer if they so elected-the unique
character of its financing does not support the conclusion that pe-
titioners had the kind of economic power which Fortner had the
burden of proving in order to prevail in this litigation.s
This decision seems to be a small step away from a myopic per se
rule of illegality. In particular, it recognizes the existence of pro-
motional sales, which is a step in the right direction. Now, our hy-
pothetical gasoline station must have some unique advantage in of-
fering car washes or other gasoline stations will be unable to show
market power in the tying good. The other gasoline stations will
have to compete by offering free car washes, direct price reduc-
tions, free glassware or trading stamps."0
In spite of the Fortner II decision, the antitrust treatment of
tying continues to be quite harsh. Although it is not really per se
illegal, rather it is prima facie illegal, 1 tying is a very hazardous
course of business conduct. If two products are sold on a condi-
tional basis, a plaintiff has wide latitude in proving sufficient eco-
nomic power in one of them. The "not insubstantial" volume of
commerce requirement is quite easily met in any modern setting.
72
This state of affairs would not be objectionable if it were true that
tying arrangements were only used to suppress competition. Unfor-
tunately, this is not the case.
III. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TYING
Tying arrangements involve two evils that the Supreme Court
has tried to prevent. First and foremost, tying arrangements deny
competitors free access to the market for the tied good. 3 Second,
buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing
products in the tied market.74 In one sense, these concerns are over
the same thing: a vague judicial feeling that it is unfair to use
69. Id. at 617-22 (footnotes omitted).
70. See Jones, supra note 21, at 40-41, who makes the sensible argument that if there
are competitors in the tying good market, then tying should not be illegal per se.
71. This point was aptly made by Slawson, A Stronger, Simpler Tie-In Doctrine, 25
ANTRrusT BuLL. 671, 675, 692 (1980). A party can raise defenses to explain why a tie-in
should not be found to be illegal.
72. For a persuasive critique of the present rule, see Baker, The Supreme Court and the
Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 VA. L. Rzv. 1235 (1980).
73. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605.
74. Id.
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power in one market to influence economic activity in a separate
market. This concern has been expressed as the leverage theory of
tie-ins.75 When the seller of tying good A requires its customers to
also buy tied good B, the Court assumed that some economic
power was transferred from the A market to the B market. Accord-
ing to this view, somehow the seller expanded or levered his mo-
nopoly power from one market to another.7 6 This, of course, is not
possible. A seller cannot get two monopoly profits from one mo-
nopoly. The only way that the seller can impose additional require-
ments on its customers, without accepting a decrease in demand, is
to reduce the price of the tying good. Thus, the leverage theory of
tying is unsatisfactory and should not provide the foundation for a
generally hostile antitrust treatment of tying arrangements. But
there is a more serious criticism: a tying arrangement is often moti-
vated by factors that are unrelated to any transfer of market power
or suppression of competition. In this section, we shall examine
several of these.
Technological Interdependence. There are times when the tying
and tied goods are technologically interdependent. The tying good
may not perform satisfactorily unless the tied good is used with it.
At the same time, the seller's reputation is on the line. In order to
protect his reputation, the seller endeavors to tie the two goods
together. In this fashion, he attempts to guarantee that the tying
good is used properly. For example, in Jerrold Electronics," the
defendant required that a buyer of its advanced cable television
antenna also buy its installation and maintenance services. Jerrold
claimed that this was necessary to prevent the antenna from per-
forming poorly. Since the cable television antenna was a rather
new development in the field with a number of potential problems,
the defendant was protecting his own goodwill. 8 In this situation
the tie-in appears to be advantageous to both the seller and the
buyer. The seller protects his reputation and the buyer is guaran-
teed a product that will operate efficiently. If this is the case, how-
ever, why is a tying arrangement necessary? Why does the buyer
have to be compelled to do what is good for him?
A buyer often makes choices based on business relationships or
75. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6; but see Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 614.
76. See Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45.
77. United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
78. Id. at 556-57.
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because the purchase is less expensive in the short run.79 A seller
may decide to compel the buyer to do what is in his own best in-
terest simply because it is more efficient to do so. The information
that is necessary for the buyer to make the correct decision may be
costly to convey. Moreover, mistakes by the buyer have conse-
quences for the seller. It is the seller's reputation that suffers when
a large number of complaints surface as a result of the improper
use of his product. Although it is true that certain buyers will have
the proper information and purchase the tied good, the simplest
and most efficient way for the seller to protect himself from those
buyers who do not take the proper precaution is to tie the two
goods together.80
Evasion of Government Regulation. Whenever the government
attempts to regulate market activity to achieve an unnatural re-
sult, it creates incentives for evading the regulation. Tie-in sales
can be used to evade two types of market interferences: ceiling
price regulation and profit regulation. In either case, the tie-in is
used to increase the seller's return without creating any new mar-
ket power.
First, consider price ceilings. Suppose that a price ceiling has
been imposed on a good that is used in fixed proportions with an-
other good that is not being regulated. The seller can increase the
price of the tied good so that the combined profit on the two goods
would be no more than what it would have been if the price of the
tying good had not been restricted. 1 No monopoly is being ex-
tended into the market for the tied good; the seller's share of the
market for the tied good would only be whatever it would have
been if the tying good had been priced freely.8 2 A simple example
may be helpful. In the early days of gasoline price controls under
President Nixon, some enterprising service stations owners recog-
79. Accord id. at 556-57.
80. The courts have given some recognition to this justification for tying. In Jerrold, for
example, the court held that the principle was sound. Id. at 557. Unfortunately for Jerrold,
it held that the practice had gone on too long and was no longer justified. Id. at 557-58. If
there is a suitable substitute for tying, the court will reject this defense. For example, in
International Salt. Co., 332 U.S. at 392, International Salt tied salt to leases on its salt
dispensing machines. International Salt made the argument that tying was necessary to pro-
tect the machines from inferior salt. The Court correctly reasoned that International Salt
could impose standards or specifications to prevent such problems. Id. at 397-98.
81. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YAE L.J. 19, 21-
23 (1957).
82. Bowman, supra note 81, at 23. This implies that the output of the tied good sold by
the monopolist may be greater than the output sold without the tie-in, but the output he
can sell to maximize profits is limited.
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nized that the mandated price was too low. As a result, they were
forced to charge a price for gasoline that was lower than the price
that buyers were willing to pay. In an effort to extract the full
value of the gasoline, they began to fill tanks only on the condition
that the customer buy a cheap plastic windshield scraper for five
dollars. The purpose was obvious: to evade the price controls and
thereby increase profits.83
Second, consider profit regulation. When a firm's profits are con-
strained by regulation this is often accomplished indirectly by
price regulations. The seller must get regulatory approval for its
prices which are supposed to yield no more than the maximum
permissible rate of return or profit."' If the regulated monopolist
also sells in an unregulated market, it can transfer profit from the
regulated to the unregulated sphere. Assume a regulated monopoly
exists in the market for lightbulbs and that this monopolist also
sells desk lamps that are sold and priced competitively. Since one
uses a desk lamp in fixed proportions with a lightbulb, by tying the
two products together, the monopolist can raise the price of the
desk lamp to a level that will create the maximum revenue had the
price of the bulbs remained unrestricted. Of course, the lightbulb
monopolist has not extended his monopoly to the market for desk
lamps but the monopolist has been able to evade the profit con-
straint through tying. 5 His total profit on the two goods equals the
profit he would have earned on the bulbs had the market been
unregulated.
Meter Pricing. In some cases, a seller may tie two complemen-
tary goods 6 in an effort to meter the use of one of them. A con-
crete. example of this motive for tying is provided by the facts in
the IBM case." IBM produced and leased its card processors to
business firms. The value to any firm of having a card processor
sitting in the office ready for use depends upon the frequency and
83. In this case, it is not necessary that the producer of the tying good actually produce
the tied good. If rivals produce the tied good more efficiently, the tying good producer will
buy the tied goods from those rivals and resell them.
84. For an exceptionally good treatment of the economics of regulation confer A. KAHN,
THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970) (in two volumes).
85. The evasion of profit constraints underlies much of the concern over the relationship
between AT&T and its wholly owned subsidiary, Western Electric. See 1 id. at 28 n.20, for a
brief discussion. In addition, see Blair, The Scope of Regulation in the Competitive Tele-
phone Equipment Market, PuB. UTm. FORT. Dec. 17, 1982, at 29.
86. Complements are goods that are used together; e.g., hot dogs and mustard, bread
and butter, paper towels and towel dispensers.
87. IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
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intensity of its use, i.e., upon the number of cards processed. But
IBM leased its card processor at a fixed monthly rate to all cus-
tomers. This lease was conditioned upon the lessee's agreement to
use IBM's cards in the card processor.8 8 IBM raised the card price
above the competitive level and earned supra-competitive profits
on the sale of cards.8" It should be noted that the user needs a card
for each unit of service performed by the processor. Thus, the
cards served a way of metering the intensity of use of the
processor.
One way of viewing this pricing arrangement is as a variable
rental rate contract. The user pays (1) a competitive price for the
cards plus (2) a user fee equal to the difference between the nomi-
nal card price and the competitive price plus (3) the monthly
rental. In effect, the rental price of the card processor is a function
of the firm's use of the card processor. Clearly, the purpose of tying
is not to monopolize the card market. It is to make more profit by
charging different rental rates to different users."
The tied good acts as a counting device. The buyer who makes
greater use of the tying good pays more than the buyer with a
smaller demand because he buys more units of service. The seller
is not in a position to remove other suppliers of the tied good from
the market because the sellers of close substitutes for the tied good
can still sell them in other markets in which the tied good is de-
manded.9 1 Moreover, the seller may buy the tied good from these
other firms. Consequently, they will sell to the tying firm rather
than directly to the tying good's user.
Those opposed to the use of a tie-in as a counting device suggest
that the monopolist might initially charge different prices to differ-
ent users of the tying good based on expected use by the buyer.
Errors, though, are likely to be made by attempting to estimate the
intensity of the buyer's use and any adjustments would be difficult
88. Id. at 134. IBM tried to claim that quality control of the cards was necessary to
protect its goodwill. This argument did not succeed due to the possibility of issuing specifi-
cations for the cards. Id. at 138-40.
89. Id. at 136.
90. Most antitrust analysts characterize this practice as price discrimination. See, e.g.,
Bowman, supra note 81, at 23, and Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws,
41 U. Cm. L. REv. 506, 508 (1974). This interpretation is not apt to be correct, however, as
Hansen & Roberts, Metered Tying Arrangements, Allocative Efficiency, and Price Discrim-
ination, 47 S. ECON. J. 73 (1980), have shown.
91. Although it occurs rarely, there is an exception. In those situations where the tied
good has no uses other than with the tying good, the competitors will be driven out of the
market for the tied good.
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to make. Any mistakes may create a loss in the potential return.
The tie-in eliminates the need for estimation and the possibility of
error.9 2
Another suggested alternative is to attach a meter to serve as a
counting device. The seller can charge the buyer a fixed rate for
the good plus a rate varying with use." This method would be just
as effective but not likely to be as efficient for the seller due to
increased costs to him for the meters as well as for the monitoring
of the meters. Monitoring the meters would require not only a
check to determine the amount of use, but also a check to deter-
mine if the meter is being tampered with or disconnected. Of
course, there are additional costs when one uses a tying arrange-
ment because the tie-in must also be monitored to prevent the
buyer from substituting cheaper tied goods of lesser quality which
the buyer can purchase at the competitive price. These additional
costs presumably are lower than those associated with metering or
a profit-maximizing firm would not select a tying arrangement.
Economies of Joint Sales. Tie-ins may be intended to take ad-
vantage of an economy of scale in either the production or distri-
bution of goods. 4 If two goods can be produced or sold together at
lower cost than they can be separately, then a tying arrangement
would be an appropriate method of ensuring the maximum return
from these goods. By requiring the buyer to purchase the goods
together, the seller can expect greater efficiency (i.e., lower costs
and higher profits) than if he were to offer the two goods sepa-
rately. Assuming that the seller passes along the economies of scale
to the buyer, the buyer would be better off buying both goods from
the seller with or without a tie-in. The buyer, however, may not
always choose the seller's tied good for non-price reasons. For ex-
ample, he may choose to purchase the tied good from another sup-
plier with whom he has developed a good business relationship.
The supplier of the tying good can eliminate this possibility
through the tying arrangment.
Another situation also requires implementation of a tie-in due to
economies of combined sales. In the Times-Picayune" case, for ex-
92. The only additional requirement would be that the overcharge on the tied good must
be specified in advance, which may be no mean feat.
93. See Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 552, 555-56 (1965).
94. An "economy of scale" exists when the per unit cost falls as the scale of operation
expands.
95. Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. 594.
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ample, the publisher of a morning and an evening newspaper re-
quired all advertisers to buy space in both papers. The facts in the
case suggested that a major portion of the cost savings would not
have been realized unless all advertisers had agreed to purchase
space in both newspapers. For example, assume there was no tying
arrangement and that one advertiser chose to buy space in the
morning edition only. This one difference in the layout of the ad-
vertising pages would make it necessary for the newspaper to rear-
range the entire layout to accommodate this one advertiser. In the
process, higher costs would have been incurred. A tie-in based on
economies of joint sales, then, increases the net return for the
seller and presumably leads to lower prices for the buyers. 6
Uncertainty.9 7 It is hardly profound to note that the world in
which we live is an uncertain place. Nonetheless, much antitrust
analysis is conducted as though risk and uncertainty do not exist.
But they do exist and are avoided by risk-averse9 8 decision makers.
In avoiding or mitigating risk, the decision-maker must give up
something - namely, profit. Tying can be used to reduce the ad-
verse effects of some kinds of uncertainty and improve the profits
of the firm offering the tie-in.
A concrete example may be helpful here. The production of a
hammer requires that one handle and one head be combined in
fixed proportions by a hammer producer. Suppose that the produc-
tion of hammer-heads is monopolized due to a legitimate patent,99
and that the production and sale of handles and hammers are com-
petitively organized. The hammer-head monopolist will attempt to
maximize his profits through selecting the appropriate price and
output of hammer heads. This is a simple optimization problem,
which has been solved in the economics literature for some time.100
96. When there are economies of joint sales the judicial response has been to decide that
there are not two separate products. Thus, tying is not found because there is only a single
product. Id. at 613-14.
97. This section is based upon Blair & Kaserman, Uncertainty and the Incentive for
Vertical Integration, 45 S. EcON. J. 266 (1978) and Blair & Kaserman, Tying Arrangements
and Uncertainty (1982) (photocopy on file with the Florida State University Law Review).
98. A risk-averse decision maker will always reject an actuarially fair gamble. The classic
discussions of risk aversion are provided by Pratt, Risk Aversion in the Small and in the
Large, 32 EcONOMEuMCA 122 (1964) and Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing,
MARKHAM ECONOMICS SERIES 90-120 (1971).
99. This assumption of a legal hammer-head monopoly is made only so our attention is
not directed to extraneous issues. If the monopoly were not legal, the appropriate public
policy response is to prosecute the unlawful monopoly.
100. See, e.g., Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. EcON. 347
(1950).
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Suppose that the price of the handles is uncertain but that the
hammer producers must commit themselves to specific production
levels before they are able to observe the price they will have to
pay for these handles. In other words, each firm must plan its fu-
ture output of hammers on the basis of orders for future delivery
and some probabilistic notion of what the handle prices will be. Of
course, each hammer producer will be aware of the actual costs
only when the handles and heads are purchased. It has been shown
that the risk-averse hammer producer will attempt to mitigate the
impact of uncertainty by acting cautiously in determining his pro-
duction levels. 10 1 Consequently, his need for hammer-heads and
handles is reduced. As a direct result, the hammer-head monopo-
list's profit declines because he is selling fewer hammer-heads.
Consider the effect of a tie-in sale. The hammer-head monopo-
list could offset this impact of uncertainty by selling heads and
handles in a package to the hammer producers. Specifically, the
hammer-head monopolist will buy handles at the competitive, al-
beit random, price. The hammer producers will then buy one han-
dle and one head at certain prices for each hammer that they in-
tend to produce. Due to the intervention in the handle market and
the removal of uncertainty, the hammer producers will expand
output and their purchases of hammer-heads.
The need for tying in this case is clear. The hammer producer
will be only too happy to buy his requirements for handles from
the hammer-head producer whenever the actual price of handles
exceeds the average price. But when the actual price is below the
average, he will try to purchase handles on the open market. The
hammer-head producer, however, wants to use the gains from sales
of handles at prices above the average to offset the losses when
prices are below the average. Thus, he will have to insist on
purchase commitments for all prices of handles. 102
The social welfare effects of tying in this instance are decidedly
positive. The output of hammers expands and its price falls
thereby making consumers better off. Hammer producers are no
worse off because uncertainty has been reduced for them. Even the
handle suppliers are better off because demand for handles ex-
pands. There appear to be no losers, only gainers.
Promotional Ties. On occasion, conditional sales are made as
101. See Blair, Random Input Prices and the Theory of the Firm, 12 EcON. INQUIEY 214,
218 (1974).
102. We are unaware of anyone's raising this defense in an actual tying case. This, how-
ever, does not mean that the theory is without empirical support.
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promotions. For example, a grocery store may offer a five-pound
bag of sugar at an extremely low price on the condition that the
buyer spend at least ten dollars in the store. Otherwise, the price
of the sugar is the normal price. It is obvious in this case that the
seller has no monopoly power. He uses a loss leader (the sugar) to
induce customers to buy less attractively priced merchandise. Al-
though the low-priced sugar is nominally a tying good, no one is
confused into thinking that this tying arrangement has any mo-
nopolistic motive, that any market is foreclosed, or that any con-
sumer choice is infringed.0 3
Not all promotional ties are so easy to analyze, however, as the
Fortner litigation demonstrates.10' U.S. Steel, which was trying to
sell prefabricated housing, offered Fortner Enterprises very attrac-
tive credit terms that covered more than the cost of the housing.
The excess credit was not available unless Fortner bought the
housing from U.S. Steel. 05 In this case, the issue of a promotional
tie arose. Was Fortner forced to buy unwanted homes in order to
get attractive financing? If so, we have a tie-in sale. Alternatively,
was the attractive financing used as an inducement to buy the
homes from U.S. Steel rather than from someone else? If so, we
have a promotion rather than a tie-in sale. 06 A promotional sale is
a means of competing whereas antitrust orthodoxy holds that tie-
in sales are a means of avoiding competition. Thus, the distinction
is very important to everyone concerned. 07
Variable Proportions. There are some tie-in sales in which the
effect on society is unknown. Whenever a tying arrangement leads
to a reduction in social welfare it should be held unlawful. 08 Such
a situation can arise when a monopolist's product is used in varia-
ble proportions by its customers in producing another commodity.
The essence of variable proportions is that one can produce a spe-
103. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6-7.
104. Fortner, 429 U.S. 610.
105. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
106. We owe this succinct distinction to Professor Milton Handler. See Handler, supra
note 21, at 1017.
107. The Court found that U.S. Steel was offering a promotion rather than a tie-in. "The
unusual credit bargain offered to Fortner proves nothing more than a willingness to provide
cheap financing in order to sell expensive houses." Fortner, 429 U.S. at 622 (footnote
omitted).
108. The proper focus of antitrust should be the promotion of competition and thereby
the promotion of consumer welfare. For a historical argument that this is proper, see H.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, 604-09 (1955). For an economic argument that
this is sound public policy, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 81-89 (1978).
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cific commodity with varying quantities of the inputs.'09 For exam-
ple, a sweater can be made with varying quantities of capital
equipment and labor. Firms can be relied upon to select that com-
bination of inputs which minimizes the costs of production and
thereby maximizes profit.
Suppose that inputs A and B are combined in variable propor-
tions to produce a commodity X. Further, assume that the produc-
tion of B and X is competitively organized while A is monopolized.
If the A monopolist sets its profit maximizing price, the X produc-
ers will substitute away from the use of A and use a relatively
greater quantity of B to produce any given quantity of X. By doing
this, the X producers will minimize their costs.
Suppose, now, that the A monopolist recognizes that its custom-
ers have substituted away from the monopolized input. One re-
sponse is to vertically integrate, while an alternative response is to
use a tying arrangement."' The A monopolist can produce the nec-
essary units of B or simply buy them from the existing producers
of B. Then he will sell inputs A and B to the producers of the final
good. His price on A will be reduced and the price on B will be
raised to the point where the ratio of the prices charged is equal to
the ratio of competitive prices. When this has been accomplished,
the producers of X will not substitute away from the monopolized
input A. The X producers will use the socially efficient combina-
tion of inputs for the quantity of X produced. The input A monop-
olist will extract all of the monopoly profit inherent in the demand
for X by raising both input prices above their costs in the same
proportion.
As a general proposition, the social welfare effects are indetermi-
nate.111 This results from the fact that we are trading off higher X
prices and smaller X output for more efficient production. There
are, however, instances where the X output increases.11 2
In contrasting the use of tie-in as a counting device with the va-
riable proportion situation, the difference lies in the necessity of
control over the tied good. The tie-in is not essential to the max-
imization of profits in the counting case, i.e., a meter can be used.
109. Our hammer example, supro notes 99-102 and accompanying text, involved fixed
rather than variable proportions.
110. See Blair & Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and Antitrust Policy, 68 Am.
ECON. Rxv. 397 (1978), for a brief, albeit technical, discussion of this point.
111. Id. and the references cited therein.
112. See Mallela & Nahata, Theory of Vertical Control with Variable Proportions, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 1009 (1980), for a highly technical development.
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The tie-in simply guarantees the optimal results. In the variable
proportion situation, though, without control over the tied good
the seller's profits will not increase. As the price of the tying good
increases, the demand for that good and all its complements de-
creases. 1 3 Consequently, the seller wants to keep the relative
prices of the commodities equal to the relative competitive prices.
This will prevent the unwanted substitution away from the mo-
nopolized commodity.
Summary. We have discussed several reasons why a producer
might want to employ tying arrangements. All of these have to do
with making more money, i.e., more profit. Generally, the purpose
is not to monopolize or control another market. Instead, the pur-
pose is to use whatever market power currently exists more effec-
tively. This, of course, is sensible because there is only one monop-
oly profit to be extracted.
The Supreme Court, however, has continued to express concern
over the foreclosure of rivals in the tied-good market." 4 There can
be little doubt that when a buyer agrees to purchase commodity B
from his supplier of A the rival sellers of B are foreclosed. The real
question is whether this makes any difference to consumer welfare.
First, suppose that the monopolist of A is at least as efficient in
producing B as the rival sellers of B. There is no reason to object
to the tying arrangement because the tied good is being produced
as efficiently as or more efficiently than otherwise. Second, suppose
that the rival sellers of B are more efficient than the A monopolist.
We should expect the A monopolist to buy B from its rivals and
resell to its customers. There is no economic reason to object in
this case either. The producers of B compete for sales to the A
producer rather than to the A producer's customers. It should not
make very much difference at which distribution level the competi-
tion is located. The competition among the producers and their ac-
cess to the market still exists.
We should also recognize that the tied-good market is often very
specialized. For example, in the IBM"" case the foreclosed sellers
were paper companies that could not sell punch cards to IBM cus-
tomers. But these firms could make a large number of other paper
products. It would appear that in most of the other tying cases, no
significant foreclosure had occurred in the tied-good market.
113. See Bowman, supra, note 81, at 27.
114. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6; Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605.
115. 298 U.S. 131.
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The Supreme Court has also expressed concern for consumer
sovereignty.11 6 Those customers who are subject to the tying ar-
rangement supposedly are denied freedom of choice. This is true in
the sense that a consumer's range of choice is restricted by the
tying arrangement. The seller simply refuses to sell the tying good
alone. Thus, the buyer faces several options. First, he can buy the
proffered package and consume the tied and tying goods. Second,
he can buy the package and resell the tied good or throw it away if
it is really of no value. Third, he can do without the tying good and
refuse to buy the package. In this case, he may substitute the prod-
uct of a competitor of the tying good seller if such competitors ex-
ist. If no competitors exist, he must simply do without if he elects
to refuse the tied package. Some careful thought reveals that the
use of a tying arrangement is equivalent to a price increase in
many cases. Of course, a price increase reduces the welfare of con-
sumers, but that should be the focus of attention. The current fo-
cus on consumer choice is misdirected and misleading.
As the discussion above indicates, there are many reasons for ty-
ing arrangements. An unintended by-product may be a reduction
in consumer choice, but it should be recognized that all products
offered represent a compromise of sorts. Those characteristics that
appeal to the largest number of consumers are combined and of-
fered in the market. Many consumers are mildly dissatisfied with
some dimension of the products currently available, but the ex-
isting combination is offered because it is most profitable for the
seller. Much the same is true of tying arrangments. Infringement
on consumer sovereignty is not the central concern of antitrust
policy. A more profitable focus of attention would be on the anti-
competitive and the pro-competitive effects of tying.
IV. A POLICY DILEMMA
Our analysis in the preceding two sections suggests that a rather
serious public policy dilemma exists. The legal and economic inter-
pretations of tying arrangements are not congruent. The antitrust
statutes and the judicial opinions are hostile toward this business
practice. 11 7 In contrast, our economic analysis found little to con-
demn in tie-in sales." 8 As a matter of fact, tying can lead to ex-
panded output and lower prices under certain circumstances. In
116. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6; Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605.
117. See supra notes 11-72 and accompanying text.
118. See generally supra notes 73-113 and accompanying text.
1983]
556 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:531
these instances, consumer welfare is actually improved by the tying
arrangement - a result that should be applauded rather than
inhibited.
The solution to this dilemma is deceptively simple. At the next
opportunity, the Supreme Court should reconsider its attitude to-
ward tying arrangements. A careful analysis will reveal that this
business practice is of little antitrust concern. When tying is used
to protect goodwill due to technological interdependence,' 9 to mit-
igate the influence of risk and uncertainty, 120 to exploit the econo-
mies of joint sales,12" ' or as a means of promotional selling,'22 the
welfare effects of tying are clearly positive. When tying is used to
evade government price or profit regulation, 2 3 one may have some
objections to tying, but they are not antitrust objections. Using tie-
in sales as a metering device1 4 is not objectionable. The seller ex-
ploits his market power more effectively, but not necessarily to the
detriment of his customers. Finally, we come to the variable pro-
portions motive2 for tie-in sales. The welfare effects in this case
are admittedly ambiguous. Accordingly, one must be a little tenta-
tive in condoning tying arrangements in these circumstances.
Given the predominance of positive or innocuous motives for ty-
ing, the Court should start its analysis from the premise that tying
is presumptively legal. The per se illegality test should be abol-
ished. A plaintiff then would have to shoulder the additional bur-
den of demonstrating that a particular tying arrangement was an-
ticompetitive. This burden would not be met by simply showing
that a large volume of commerce was involved. By itself, this sta-
tistic has no informational content. For a business practice to of-
fend the antitrust laws, it should have the effect of reducing con-
sumer welfare. Thus, a successful plaintiff should have to prove
that output is lower or prices are higher as a result of the tying
arrangement. As the law now stands, plaintiffs can meet their bur-
den of proof without establishing any adverse effect on consumer
welfare.
V. INDIVIDUAL COERCION IN THE LOWER COURTS
Some lower courts have acknowledged the social utility of tying
119. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
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arrangements, but have been bound by precedent to apply the Su-
preme Court's qualified per se rule.'26 These courts surely recog-
nize that once a plaintiff obtains standing he will prevail even if
consumer welfare is enhanced by the tying arrangement. This un-
fortunate state of affairs results from the fact that the per se rules
on tying do not require a showing of injury to consumers. This is
especially troublesome in a franchising context where the fran-
chisee may benefit from the tying arrangement and even welcome
it. In a class action context where the damage exposure can be
enormous, the franchisor's vulnerability is particularly distressing.
A relatively new inquiry has emerged that offers some protection
to franchisors: the individual coercion doctrine.
The idea that coercion is an element of a successfully imposed
tying arrangement has been acknowledged by the courts for some
time.'27 In fact, some of the Supreme Court's language suggests a
need to show compulsion. 28 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
never considered coercion to be a controlling factor in any of its
decisions. In 1971, the Second Circuit became the first court to ex-
plicitly focus on coercion as a requisite element in a tying case. In
its American Manufacturers '2  decision, that court held that
"there can be no illegal tie unless unlawful coercion by the seller
influences the buyer's choice."' 30 This decision was based upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Loew's,'3 ' which employed terminol-
ogy such as "successful pressure"132 and "forced . . . to take un-
wanted films."'3 s Although the Supreme Court's reasoning behind
its decision did not reflect these coercion-related issues, the Second
126. For example, in Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir.
1977), the Ninth Circuit reviewed the economic rationales for tying and concluded that
"[t]he clear implication from a purely economic standpoint is that tie-ins should be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis because they are not inherently detrimental. They can in fact
be beneficial." Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's approach was endorsed with a disap-
pointing admission of judicial incompetence: "The difficulty with adopting such an approach
... stems from the unwillingness, if not the inability, of courts to undertake complex eco-
nomic decision making in the face of economic indeterminancy and over-crowded court cal-
endars." Id.
127. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc.,
446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1063 (1972).
128. Fortner, 394 U.S. at 503-04; Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49; Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S.at 6;
and Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 605. Handler, supra note 121, at 1017, distinguishes sales
promotions from tying arrangements on the basis of compulsion.
129. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1131.
130. Id. at 1137.
131. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38.
132. Id. at 40.
133. Id. at 49.
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Circuit interpreted its language as being relevant to the facts in
the case at hand. In so doing, it established a coercion doctrine.3"
Since American Manufacturers involved only a single buyer,
proof of coercion by other buyers was not a factor. This did not
become an issue until a year later when it was raised in the context
of a class action.'35 In order for class certification to be granted to
a plaintiff in tying arrangement cases, the plaintiff must meet the
specific requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. One requirement of this rule calls for questions of mutual
interest to the putative class members to predominate over indi-
vidual questions. ' As the following review of cases will indicate,
several lower courts have virtually eliminated the possibility of es-
tablishing class certification by creating the individual coercion
doctrine.
In Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc.,137 a franchisee of Lum's failed to
obtain class certification for 400 Lum's franchisees in a case involv-
ing a tying agreement that was not an explicit component of the
franchise agreement. The court found itself in the awkward posi-
tion of being unable to determine whether the tie-in claimed by
the plaintiff affected all of Lum's franchisees in the same manner
since it was not expressly written into the contract.1 38 Upon citing
American Manufacturers,13 9 the court declared that "[s]uch proof
will necessarily vary from franchisee to franchisee. If the Aber-
crombies were to establish that they made forced purchases it
would not necessarily follow that other franchisees were similarly
coerced. . . Determination of the issue requires separate, distinct
and individual, not common, proof.'"" Since the pronouncement
of this doctrine, many courts have accepted it without question
when confronted with class actions in a tying arrangement context,
provided that there is no "substantial conformity" '' in the tying
134. American Manufacturers is considered to be the authoritative case for the coercion
doctrine. Note, Tying Arrangements and the Individual Coercion Doctrine, 30 VAND. L.
REV. 755, 761-62 (1977). The validity of this decision was confirmed three years later in
Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1974), which sum-
marized, without explaining the connection, the holdings in many of the precedential Su-
preme Court cases dealing with tying arrangements after citing American Manufacturers.
135. Abercrombie v. Lum's Inc., 345 F. Supp. 387 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
137. 345 F. Supp. 387.
138. Id. at 390.
139. 446 F.2d 1131.
140. 345 F. Supp. at 391-92 (footnote omitted).
141. See Note, supra note 135, at 771-73, for a summary of post-Abercrombie cases
which finds that "substantial conformity" refers to the existence of no more than five differ-
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contracts of the franchisees. It is a powerful basis for denying class
certification in franchise tying cases, but it has not been adopted
by all courts.
In the Dunkin' Donuts"42 litigation, for example, a district court
was not so amenable to denying class certification on individual
coercion grounds. Fourteen franchisees sought class certification on
behalf of over 600 franchisees. They alleged that Dunkin' Donuts
had tied its trademark and accumulated goodwill to other less de-
sirable products such as equipment supplies, signs, real estate, and
advertising.14 s The district court explicitly rejected 144 the individ-
ual coercion doctrine and certified the class because it found com-
mon questions to predominate over individual questions.
On appeal, however, the Third Circuit reversed the holding of
the district court and, thereby, reestablished the individual coer-
cion doctrine: "Where, as here, plaintiff franchisees place no reli-
ance on express contractual tie-ins, each, individually, must prove
that his purchases were coerced."'"45 The court focused on the Su-
preme Court's concern with the leverage theory of tying: "We be-
lieve that coercion is implicit-both logically and linguistically-in
the concept of leverage upon which the illegality of tying is pre-
mised: the seller with market power in one market uses that power
as a 'lever' to force acceptance of his product in another mar-
ent types of tying contracts. See also Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 69 F.R.D.
331 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Individual proof is necessary if nineteen contracts exist, Thompson v.
T.F.I. Cos., 64 F.R.D. 140, 144 (N.D. IW. 1974). Those franchisees who are subject to the
same contract provisions could presumably file their own class action, i.e., the plaintiff in
Thompson could form a class comprised of those franchisees who signed the same contract
as he. This issue has not been addressed by the courts, Note, supra note 134, at 773, states
that "coercion generally will be inferred from the contracts themselves" in the latter
situation.
142. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 531
F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
143. Id. at 80-82.
144. Id. at 111-13. The court documented its assertion, id. at 99-106, that "the Supreme
Court had not set forth a coercion requirement in the tying cases." Id. at 98. It conceded
that coercion may play a role, but it is only "one mode of proving use of economic power."
Id. at 114. Other modes include "evidence of a firm and resolutely enforced company policy
to influence the franchisees to purchase from the franchisor or its designated sources ...
[and] . .. the acceptance by a large number of buyers of a burdensome or uneconomic tie."
Id. at 115. The use of economic power is the inquiry which the court considered to be signif-
icant. Accordingly, the court held that the individual coercion doctrine as the sole standard
of proof would lead to "metaphysical analysis," id. at 112, and would not account for those
illegal ties in which the defendant was able to prove that the plaintiff purchased voluntarily.
Id. at 98.
145. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211, 1226 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
19831
560 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:531
ket. .. "1 In addition to recognizing coercion as an integral as-
pect of a tying violation, the circuit court addressed individual co-
ercion in particular: "What is sufficient to coerce one buyer's
choice may not be sufficient to coerce another buyer's
choice ... "I'll
Subsequently, in 1977 the Third Circuit was confronted by an
express tying clause in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.148 Consistent
with its earlier decision in Dunkin' Donuts, it ruled that if the al-
leged tie-in is expressly stated in the agreement between the buyer
and the seller, then class certification would be appropriate be-
cause "the factual and legal questions presented in this phase will
be precisely the same in a class action as they would be in an indi-
vidual suit. 1 4 9 Consequently, the Third Circuit found coercion and
the express agreement to be two alternative conditions for estab-
lishing the existence of a tie-in.1 50 If the contract calls for a tie-in,
then there is no need for an inquiry into coercion and class certifi-
cation will not be denied on those grounds.
Some other courts have followed the Third Circuit's approach on
implicit coercion.1 5' When the tying arrangement has not been
stated explicitly, proof of individual coercion is necessary. This, of
course, precludes class certification. Other courts have contradicted
the view of the Third Circuit. For example, the Ninth Circuit does
not require proof of actual coercion even when the tying require-
ment is not explicitly stated. Its r6asoning depends upon the some-
what circular reasoning in Fortner I:
Although some cases in other circuits have required a showing
of actual coercion ... our reading of the Supreme Court's opin-
ions supports the view that coercion may be implied from a show-
ing that an appreciable number of buyers have accepted burden-
146. Id. at 1218.
147. Id. at 1219.
148. 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
149. Id. at 453. In Dunkin' Donuts, 531 F.2d at 1226 n.17, the court stated: "We do not
decide the question whether the individual coercion doctrine would bar a class certification
where a potential class of plaintiffs relies on express contactual provisions."
150. In Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, Inc., 475 F.
Supp. 973, 988 (D. Mass. 1979), the Bogosian rationale of setting aside coercion when "the
tie is manifest in the express terms of a standard form contract" was adopted by this dis-
trict court.
151. Hehir v. Shell Oil Co., 72 F.R.D. 18 (D. Mass. 1976); Response of Carolina, Inc. v.
Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1327-28 (5th Cir. 1976); and Sargent-Welch Scientific
Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978). These
courts definitely follow the Third Circuit in its treatment of this issue.
ANTITRUST
some terms, such as a tie-in, and there exists sufficient economic
power in the tying product market ...
Coercion occurs when the buyer must accept the tied item and
forego possibly desirable substitutes."'
This rationale does not account for efficiency considerations and
may, in fact, promote economic inefficiency by inhibiting an effi-
cient organization of economic activity.1
5 3
VI. LEGAL CONFUSION SURROUNDING INDIVIDUAL COERCION
The courts that require proof of individual coercion base this de-
mand on Supreme Court opinions. Unfortunately, the courts that
do not require such proof also cite to Supreme Court opinions as
justification. Obviously, the legal effect of coercion is unclear. In
the Second Circuit's decisions'" which introduced coercion as an
element of an illegal tie-in, the courts cited several Supreme Court
decisions for support. Unfortunately, the Second Circuit neglected
to explain the transition from those Supreme Court cases, which
did not set forth an explicit coercion requirement, to its enuncia-
tion of a coercion doctrine. 155 The Third Circuit was more helpful.
After reviewing the major Supreme Court decisions on tying, it
found that coercion was an essential ingredient of an illegal tying
arrangement. The court stated that this finding emanated from the
Supreme Court's concern with the leverage theory of tying.' "
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit states that proof of actual coercion
is unnecessary by pointing to the Supreme Court's language sug-
gesting that coercion can be inferred from the number of buyers
that have participated in the tying arrangement.1 57 This inference
is unsupportable from an economic perspective. The Ninth Circuit
152. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d at 1216-17 (citations omitted).
153. In Principe, 631 F.2d at 309 (citing Phillips v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 602
F.2d 616, 627 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980)) the court acknowledged the
special nature of the franchise relationship and the efficiency considerations: "'the very es-
sence of a franchise is the purchase of several related products in a single competitively
attractive package.'" The court concluded that "[w]here the challenged aggregation is an
essential ingredient of the franchised system's formula for success, there is but a single
product and no tie in exists as a matter of law." Id. at 309.
154. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 446 F.2d. at 1137 (citing Loew's, 371 U.S. 38,
and Fortner, 394 U.S. 495), and Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d at 661-
63 (citing International Salt, 332 U.S. 392, Loew's, 371 U.S. 38, and Fortner, 394 U.S. 495).
155. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
156. Dunkin' Donuts, 531 F.2d at 1218. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d at 1216. See supra note 146 and accom-
panying text.
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relied largely upon some unfortunate language in the Fortner I de-
cision of 1969.158 The Court's reasoning depends upon the charac-
terization of tying as a "burdensome term."6 9 Our earlier analysis
of tying, however, indicates that it is not always burdensome to the
customer. Certainly in the case of promotional ties the buyer will
not feel burdened. Consequently, the logic behind inferring coer-
cion from sheer numbers is tenuous at best and may be simply
erroneous. 0
The Supreme Court has never instituted a coercion requirement
for finding an illegal tie-in, either explicitly or implicitly.' 60
The Supreme Court has spoken of "coercion," "force," and
"pressure" in its tying decisions, but it has identified these as un-
desirable consequences of unlawful tying arrangements. The Third
Circuit, however, believes that leverage implies coercive use of eco-
nomic power. In contrast, the Supreme Court has defined leverage
as the use of economic power without regard to coercion. The
Court's most recent decision on tying, Fortner 11' 6' in 1977, made
no mention of coercion although the opinion was written five or six
years after the lower courts began to examine coercion. 162 As a re-
sult, the confusion surrounding the issue of coercion continues
unabated.
One possible explanation for the confusion lies in the various
meanings given to the term. One district court illustrated that co-
ercion has been used differently in different instances.'63 Coercion
has been defined as the use of economic power.6 4 In another case
it was defined as the acceptance of a burdensome tie-in by an ap-
preciable number of buyers in the market.'66 In still another case,
coercion depended upon a determination of the purchaser's will-
ingness to buy the tied good.' One commentator has identified a
number of hypothetical factors which should be taken into account
in determining if coercion exists, 67 while another has drawn from a
158. Fortner, 394 U.S. at 504. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 11-72 and accompanying text for a review of the requirements es-
tablished by the Supreme Court. Austin, supra note 10, at 1179 argues that the existence of
a tying arrangement can be determined without regard to coercion.
161. 429 U.S. 610.
162. Of course, since an explicit agreement was involved setting forth the tie, the Su-
preme Court did not have to reach the coercion issue.
163. Dunkin' Donuts, 68 F.R.D. at 112.
164. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 446 F.2d at 1137.
165. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d at 1216-17.
166. Capital Temporaries, Inc., 506 F.2d at 665-66.
167. See Varner, Voluntary Ties and the Sherman Act, 50 S. CALIF. L. REV. 271, 296-98
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number of cases to demonstrate the variety of factors which the
courts actually have considered. '68 With all of this variation in us-
age, it is small wonder that confusion surrounds the proper role of
coercion in tying cases.
VII. COERCION As A FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF
TYING AND LIABILITY
Because tying is a qualified per se violation of the antitrust laws
there is a distinction between proving the existence of the tie-in
and establishing the illegality of the tie-in. A plaintiff first must
show that a conditional sale of the tie-in variety has occurred and
thereby prove the existence of a possibly illegal business practice.
Recall that section 3 of the Clayton Act forbids tie-in sales only
when they have substantial anticompetitive effects.16 9 Conse-
quently, to establish the defendant's liability the plaintiff also
must show that the tying arrangement is illegal. As one commenta-
tor has argued, however, the distinction between the existence and
the illegality (or liability) of a tying arrangement is not always
honored in practice. 70 Some lower courts seem to lose sight of the
difference between existence and liability.1 7 ' The Third Circuit, for
example, has stated that "proof of a tie-in must focus on the
buyer, because a voluntary purchase of two products is simply not
a tie-in.' ' 7 2 Once coercion is analyzed separately with respect to
existence and liability, it is clear that coercion has minimal rele-
vance in establishing the existence of a tie-in and from an eco-
nomic perspective is irrelevant to the determination of liability for
that tie-in.
The Existence of a Tying Arrangement. If we divide all tying
arrangements into two classes, (1) tying by express agreement and
(2) implied-in-fact tying,17 3 we shall be able to organize the discus-
(1977).
168. See Note, supra note 134, at 768-69.
169. Section 3 forbids conditional sales when their effect is "to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
170. See Austin, supra note 10, at 1152.
171. Some may argue that the Supreme Court's attenuation of the standards of proof of
liability have made the distinction between existence and liability one without a difference.
See supra notes 31-72 and accompanying text.
172. 531 F.2d at 1224. In contrast to the Third Circuit's conclusion that coercion is only
relevant to determining the existence of a tie-in, it is important to note that the tie-in may
exist but it may not be illegal because the purchases are voluntary. American Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co., 446 F.2d at 1133.
173. This dichotomy is Austin's, supra note 10, at 1154.
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sion more clearly. When tying arrangements are by express agree-
ment between the buyer and the seller, the existence of the tie-in
is established automatically. In fact, one court in the Ninth Circuit
explicitly adopted this position. 74 If a seller expressly (i.e., in the
written contract) required the buyer to purchase the tied good,
then the tie-in exists. Since that decision, sellers electing to use a
tying arrangement rarely do so expressly. Absent an express con-
tractual agreement, the tie-in must be inferred from the interac-
tion between the buyer and the seller, which brings us to the im-
plied-in-fact tying arrangements.
Within the category of implied-in-fact tying arrangements, there
are two sub-categories: practical effect tie-ins and refusal-to-deal
tie-ins. When a contract between a buyer and seller nominally per-
mits the buyer to substitute the products of other sellers but actu-
ally denies him that freedom in practice, we have a practical effect
tie-in. 7 " There are many ways that practical effect tie-ins can oc-
cur. For example, requiring that suppliers of complementary goods
be approved can be abused quite easily.176 The technological de-
sign of the tying good may permit only the use of the supplier's
tied goods. 177 Practical effect tie-ins have virtually the same impact
as an express tying agreement, but they are more subtle and conse-
quently are more difficult to recognize. In initially establishing only
the existence of a tie-in, however, coercion would not be relevant
to that determination for a practical effect tie-in because the court
can look to other factors to establish its existence. 78
Refusal-to-deal tie-ins refer to those tie-ins in which it is proven
that the buyer was threatened with termination of the contract un-
less he also purchased the tied good. The term "threat" itself im-
plies force or coercion. In this context, the "threat" of a refusal to
deal is distinguished from a mere "suggestion" that this may occur.
This may not be an operational distinction. It is, however, an in-
stance where it may be appropriate to apply the concept of coer-
174. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1967), modified
on other grounds sub. nom., Chicken Delight, Inc. v. Harris, 412 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1969).
175. See e.g., Loew's, 189 F. Supp. at 380.
176. This was the issue in Smith v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 459, 461 & n.6
(N.D. Cal. 1974).
177. This was at issue in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., 242 F. Supp. 852. Ford designed the
dashboards of certain models so that a dealer was forced to use factory installed radios. This
foreclosed plaintiff from selling to the Ford dealers. It did not foreclose them from selling to
the Ford Motor Company. Ford prevailed in this case because it convinced the court that its
design decisions were independent of its relationship with its dealers.
178. See Austin, supra note 10.
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cion to determine the existence of a tying arrangement.
Most franchise agreements provide for termination due to
vaguely worded failures on the franchisee's part. Nearly all
franchise agreements require the franchisee to make an initial
lump-sum payment in exchange for the franchise license. 79 This
gives rise to another type of refusal-to-deal tie-in that takes place
after an agreement already has been reached by the two parties.
The seller may simply add another condition to a contract, e.g.,
requiring the purchase of a tied good, although this additional
term was not part of the original agreement. The buyer, having
been attracted by the original terms and having paid a franchise
fee, may agree to purchase the tied good rather than risk losing his
franchise license. In this situation, coercion would be an acceptable
means of demonstrating the existence of an implied tie-in.
Determining Liability. After ascertaining that, in fact, a tying
arrangement exists, the plaintiff must prove that the particular ty-
ing arrangement is illegal. The liability issue should not be consid-
ered, however, until the existence has been proven.
The Supreme Court has provided a two-prong test for determin-
ing per se liability.1 80 First, a plaintiff must prove that the seller
has "sufficient economic power" in the tying good market to im-
pose burdensome terms on the buyer. This factor has been estab-
lished with the existence of patents, 181 copyrights' 82 and trade-
marks, 88 and qualitative factors such as uniqueness 184 and
desirability. 8 " The second prong requires showing that a not in-
substantial volume of commerce is involved. The Court has never
considered coercion to be a controlling factor in determining per se
liability because of its two-prong test. Coercion simply is not rele-
vant in these circumstances.
Our economic analysis of tying arrangements 8 ' does not suggest
a need to consider coercion either. For the most part, we could not
find an anti-competitive motive for tying. To be sure, the seller
employs a tying arrangement for no other purpose than to enhance
179. Caves & Murphy, Franchising: Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 S. EcON.
J. 572 (1975), suggest that the lump-sum franchise fee serves as a screening device. Those
who would be undesirable franchisees presumably cannot amass the franchise fee.
180. See supra notes 33-72 and accompanying text.
181. International Salt, 332 U.S. 392.
182. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45 n.4.
183. Principe, 631 F.2d 303.
184. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38.
185. Fortner, 394 U.S. 495.
186. See supra notes 73-113 and accompanying text.
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his profit. But this is not necessarily bad. In any event, a buyer
cannot really be coerced into doing something that is not in his
self-interest. If the seller has no market power over the tying good,
the buyer simply can go elsewhere. But even when the seller has
monopoly power over the tying good, the buyer cannot be coerced.
In his efforts to maximize his well-being, the buyer will purchase
all commodities whose prices are less than or equal to their value
to the buyer. This pertains to commodity bundles as well. The
buyer will not pay more for the combination of products than the
value of that combination.
In summary, we find a very limited role for coercion. In proving
refusal-to-deal tie-ins, the concept of coercion has some relevance.
In all other instances, however, the concept of coercion appears to
serve no useful purpose. Even in the most extreme case where the
seller has monopoly power in the tying good and that good is vital
to the buyer, coercion has no relevance. The buyer acquiesces to
the tying arrangement due to the seller's monopoly power in the
tying good, not because of his coercive sales tactics.
VIII. CONCLUSION ON COERCION
A review of the Supreme Court's analysis and our economic
analysis of tying arrangements failed to disclose any purpose
served by the concept of coercion. Several lower courts, however,
have embraced the individual coercion doctrine. They may have
done so to avoid the Supreme Court's harsh and virtual per se
treatment of tying. The Supreme Court's analysis constrains the
courts from invoking their discretion so as to permit tying arrange-
ments which have no adverse effect on consumer welfare or which
are voluntarily entered into by the plaintiff. This constraint may
be the reason for the development of the individual coercion doc-
trine. Although from an economic perspective a full fledged inquiry
into the consumer welfare effects of a tying arrangement is the
preferable approach, utilization of the coercion doctrine is prefera-
ble to the Supreme Court's harsh per se approach.
The individual coercion doctrine arises primarily in franchising
cases. It seems inherent in an attempt to establish a franchisor-
franchisee relationship that the franchisor will try to persuade the
potential franchisee of many things. It becomes the franchisee's
obligation to object if the franchisor tries to place conditions in the
agreement that will be disadvantageous to the franchisee. The
courts recognize that it is possible for persuasion to become coer-
cion. This has been considered explicitly. If the defendant can es-
ANTITRUST
tablish that the buyer made no attempt to resist the tie-in, then
the tie-in is deemed voluntary. For example, in American Manu-
facturers8 ' the court accepted the defendant's argument that the
plaintiff had not pursued a counteroffer that had been made in the
initial meetings between the two parties. Thus, this court at-
tempted to draw a distinction between a mere bargaining ploy and
a coerced tie-in, regardless of the plaintiff's subsequent claim of
coercion.
The individual coercion doctrine allows the court to draw the
admittedly fine line between aggressive, persuasive (i.e., legal)
salesmanship and coercive (i.e., illegal) salesmanship. While some
courts have eschewed such distinctions on the ground that they
require "metaphysical analysis,"' 8 other courts have not been so
bashful. As one court has pointed out, judges are rarely faced with
cut and dried issues. Instead, they must often struggle with a
party's "state of mind."8 9 The proper distinction is admittedly
vague to supporters of the individual coercion doctrine, but it may
be necessary if the courts are to protect our franchise system.
Franchising has become an increasingly popular form of business
organization over the past two decades. If no attempt is made to
distingish persuasion and coercion, the franchising movement
could be seriously hampered. The district court in Dunkin' Donuts
concluded that "where there is unequal bargaining power, it is not
necessary to prove coercion; mere persuasion or influence will suf-
fice."1 90 The consequences of such an attitude may be decidedly
undesirable. It places a heavy burden on the franchisor which
could deter franchising. Alternatively, the franchisor could elect to
offer only the franchise license to the buyer and nothing else. Such
a solution would be detrimental to both parties.
Franchising would be further deterred by the certification of
class actions in franchise tying cases. Some courts may want to
minimize the awarding of treble damages, guaranteed to winning
plaintiffs in antitrust cases, and not grant the reward to those buy-
ers who have willingly agreed to the tie-in. If the class is successful
in its case, then some recipients of the treble damages will have
been undeserving. 91 The individual coercion doctrine permits
187. 446 F.2d at 1133.
188. Dunkin' Donuts, 68 F.R.D. at 112.
189. Dunkin' Donuts, 531 F.2d at 1226.
190. 68 F.R.D. at 114.
191. Id. This logic places great weight on the compensatory function of antitrust dam-
ages and ignores to some extent the deterrent function. See generally, Blair, Antitrust Pen-
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those courts to avoid applying the Supreme Court's harsh per se
rule to franchise tying cases.
In the typical franchising case, it should be assumed that a po-
tential franchisee would tend to agree with the franchisor's pro-
posed tying arrangement at the initial contract stage because it
seems advantageous to him.19 2 After being in business for some
time, however, the franchisee may realize that he is being charged
more than the competitive price for the tied good. He then resents
his commitment to the franchisor and the constraints it places
upon him in arranging a better deal elsewhere. By successfully
proving an antitrust violation against the franchisor on grounds of
an illegal tie-in, the franchisee may end up with the original bene-
fit of a franchise purchased at an attractive price as well as treble
damages resulting from the illegal tie-in. The courts favoring the
individual coercion doctrine, therefore, are protecting the
franchisor and the franchising system he promotes.193 These courts
should be applauded for their efforts.
alties: Deterrence and Compensation, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 57.
192. It would be advantageous in the sense that he is offered a franchise at below the
monopoly price and simply has to agree to purchase tied goods.
193. The Fourth Circuit's recent holding in Principe, 631 F.2d 303, however, may be
signalling a new doctrine which does not automatically assume that two goods are involved
when a franchisor sells something else in addition to a franchise license.
